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Genetic Representation Explains the Cluster
of Innateness-Related Properties
NICHOLAS SHEA
Abstract: The concept of innateness is used to make inferences between various
better-understood properties, like developmental canalization, evolutionary adaptation,
heritability, species-typicality, and so on (‘innateness-related properties’). This article
uses a recently-developed account of the representational content carried by inheritance
systems like the genome to explain why innateness-related properties cluster together,
especially in non-human organisms. Although inferences between innateness-related
properties are deductively invalid, and lead to false conclusions in many actual cases,
where some aspect of a phenotypic trait develops in reliance on a genetic representation
it will tend, better than chance, to have many of the innateness-related properties. The
account also shows why inferences between innateness-related properties sometimes
fail and argues that such inferences are especially misleading when applied to human
psychology and behaviour because human psychological development is especially reliant
on non-genetic inherited representations.
1. Introduction
Innateness claims have a long history in philosophy and have, post-Chomsky,
become a central feature of psychology and cognitive science. Studies of what are
taken to be innate psychological capacities have proven fruitful in areas such as
object permanence, causal inference and basic arithmetical operations in children;
object tracking, face recognition and visual perception in adults; and in studies of
these and other mechanisms in other species. Yet when philosophers and others
have attempted to pin down what it is for a trait to be innate they have found it hard
to make coherent sense of the concept. In behavioural ecology the term has been
rejected (Bateson, 1991) or superseded by the idea that some traits are programmed
in the genes; in molecular developmental biology it is hardly used at all.
Various properties are associated with a trait’s being innate, which do not in fact
correlate very well in actual cases: its emergence in development being canalized,
its being unlearned, its being an adaptation, and so on. The concept of innateness is
relied on to underpin inferences between such properties, for example: feature T of
psychology is unlearned, hence T is innate, hence T is an adaptation. Many different
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properties feature in inferences of that form. Amongst all the conceptions associated
with the concept by ordinary users or in particular sciences, the following nine
are central and representative of the range of issues under discussion.1 Following
Mameli (2008),2 I call these innateness-related properties or i-properties:
i-properties
(i) Present at birth;
(ii) Genetically-determined;
(iii) Invariant: arises in development despite variation in the environment.
Active version—developmentally canalized: the trait is the result of
mechanisms that buffer its development against environmental variation3;
(iv) Universal in the species (or typical of members of the species)4;
(v) An evolutionary adaptation;
(vi) Programmed in the genes;
(vii) A phenotypic difference caused by a genetic difference, or a genetically
heritable trait;
(viii) Not learned / not the result of a psychological acquisition mechanism.
Generalises: not the result of a mechanism of adaptive plasticity
(caveat: nor produced by evolutionarily abnormal factors);
(ix) An internally-organised module responsible for a system of behaviour.
This list represents the leading proposals for giving an analysis of the concept of
innateness (i.e. spelling out its definition or meaning—which is not our project).5
The problems with that project are well known: no analysis suffices to capture all
or most of the intuitive applications of the concept, not even the central ones.6
1 The list is based on the seven different senses identified by Bateson (1991, p. 21) as in use in
studies of animal behaviour, supplemented and adapted in the light of the subsequent literature
including Griffiths and Gray, 1994; Cowie, 1999; Ariew, 1999; Samuels, 2002; Khalidi, 2002;
Griffiths, 2002, 2009 and the comprehensive survey found in Mameli and Bateson, 2006—and
indeed much of the literature on innateness cited below.
2 Mameli and Bateson (2006, p. 178) coined the term ‘i-properties’ for candidates to be a
scientific successor to the folk concept (which therefore need not in principle be restricted
to conceptions actually associated with the concept by concept users). Mameli (2008, p. 745)
defines ‘i-properties’ slightly differently, as properties that regularly feature in inferences to or
from the claim that a trait is innate. The term is used in the latter sense in this article.
3 Note, for brevity ‘canalized’ is used as shorthand for canalization against environmental, as
opposed to genetic, variation.
4 Species-typicality is supposed to be something stronger than a mere statistical tendency as in:
‘humans typically have brown eyes, but green and blue eyes are also quite frequent’. The
term is used to mark the fact that even traits that are characteristic of a species usually admit
of exceptions in pathological or unusual cases. Here, the shorthand ‘universal’ is used in that
sense.
5 Stich, 1975; Ariew, 1999; Cowie, 1999; Khalidi, 2002 and Samuels, 2002 offer different
analyses or theoretical reconstructions of the concept; Griffiths, 2002; Mameli and Bateson,
2006; Godfrey-Smith, 2007; Mameli, 2008 and Mameli and Bateson, 2011 exemplify pessimism
about there being a good analysis. See Griffiths, 2009 for a review.
6 Griffiths, 2002; Mameli and Bateson, 2006; Mameli, 2008; Cowie, 2009.
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Thus, many seemingly innate traits develop long after birth (e.g. male facial hair)
and some learning occurs before birth (e.g. neonates learn the prosodic structure of
their native language in utero). No trait is genetically-determined in the sense of
being wholly genetically caused; nor are universal, adaptive and seemingly innate
traits particularly well insulated against environmental variation—for example, in
most primates, development of normal skin structure depends on the ingestion of
dietary vitamin C. Adaptations can depend upon learning (plausibly, visuomotor
control in primates) and may not be universal or species-typical (e.g. adaptive
polymorphisms), nor are all universal traits adaptations (e.g. the human chin).
In short, the counterexamples to putative analyses of the concept of innateness
proliferate.
The standard counterexamples don’t just present an obstacle to a satisfying analysis
of the concept of innateness. They also cast doubt on the project of giving any
kind of theoretical reconstruction of the property of being innate. The concept of
innateness is variously deployed in inferences to and from features (i) to (ix) on
the list. Yet the familiar counterexamples show, not just that there is no analysis of
the concept that will make most of those inferences deductively valid, but that on
any potential theoretical reconstruction, using any concept to make inferences back
and forth between features (i) to (ix) will lead to false conclusions in many actual
cases.
This article argues that the i-properties nevertheless cluster together, in the sense
that they tend to be co-instantiated better than chance; at least, they tend to
co-occur in non-human animals. Conversely, when a trait lacks one or more of
the i-properties it tends, better than chance, to lack the others. Mameli (2008) uses
‘cluster’ in the stronger sense of forming a homeostatic property cluster (Boyd,
1991), and one which supports inferences between i-properties with a relatively
high degree of confidence. Mameli and Bateson (2011, p. 441) similarly require a
cluster to vindicate most of the inferences with a high level of reliability. I claim only
that the i-properties cluster together in the weaker sense of being co-instantiated
together better than chance and for a reason. That claim is still strong enough to
be incompatible with Mameli’s and Bateson’s preferred conclusion, namely that
the i-properties form a clutter —that there is no syndrome which explains why the
i-properties tend to co-occur and that the idea that they do is an illusion (Mameli
and Bateson, 2011, p. 441). This article takes up Mameli and Bateson’s challenge
to ‘give an account of the i-properties that constitute the cluster, and of the causal
processes that connect such properties and cause them to co-occur’ (p. 441).
I should make clear from the outset, however, that I don’t think the i-properties
cluster together well enough that the concept of innateness should be retained. It
remains deeply problematic for all the reasons alluded to above. Furthermore, once
we have seen the reason why the i-properties co-occur in other animals—to the
extent that they do—it becomes clear that they will tend to come apart particularly
radically in respect of human behavioural traits. That makes innateness claims in
psychology especially misleading.
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Genetic Representation Explains the Innateness Cluster 469
1.1 The Importance Attached to Innateness
The topic has considerable importance given the central role played by innateness
claims in both everyday and scientific thinking about the mind. In social and
political contexts we use claims of innateness to assess whether outcomes like
educational attainment, vocational skills, moral principles, health and happiness can
be affected by policies and interventions that we might adopt as a parent, as a
teacher, or as a society. The claim that a trait is innate also plays a role in assessing
personal responsibility. People typically think of innate characteristics as outside a
person’s individual responsibility (although still perhaps subject to censure), on a par
with characteristics produced by an external cause that is beyond one’s control. The
everyday thought is roughly that the development of such traits does not occur via
the ordinary personal-level processes of believing, wanting, reasoning and forming
intentions. They are taken to be part of the psychological background, as a matter of
the phenomenology of an individual’s psychology—part of the framework within
which our psychological development operates. By contrast if a person behaves in
a particular way or holds a certain belief because of learning, then she will be aware
of the etiology, of the reasons why she reached that outcome—or so the thought
goes.
The sense that innate traits develop by a route that bypasses personal-level
awareness is clearly part of the popular idea that some behavioural dispositions are
‘hard-wired’. With that idea the confusions multiply further. The idea is supposed
to be that, if a psychological trait is universal, then it is probably hard-wired, and
not under the control of personal-level choice and reasoning. Furthermore, if we
discover a basis in the brain for the trait (as if there might not be one), then that
confirms that the behaviour has been hard-wired into us by our genes. The result
is a capacity that is insulated from reason and that we can’t do anything about, even
through society-wide environmental interventions. The term ‘hard-wired’ lends a
pseudo-scientific credibility to this misguided tangle of commitments.
The concept of innateness is also relied on in science to underpin inferences
between various of the i-properties (Knobe and Samuels, in progress), probably in
different ways in different sciences (Linquist et al., 2011, p. 452). These inferences
also go wrong, for the same reasons, most likely in slightly different ways in different
disciplines (Mameli and Bateson, 2006).
So a concept which is important in both scientific and everyday use misleads: it
underpins bad inferences to false conclusions. But even if a concept of innateness
which rolls together the i-properties is so deeply confused that it ought to be
eliminated, we still need to examine whether the central forms of reasoning in
which innateness claims are deployed have any merit. For everyday reasoning, we
need to know whether the genuine concerns which have often been expressed
using the concept of innateness can be articulated in other ways. Armed with an
understanding of why the i-properties cluster together to the extent that they do,
we can better address society’s questions about the efficacy of interventions and of
the role of the will in individual development. And for scientific purposes, we want
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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to know whether the i-properties cluster together better than chance, to understand
why, and thereby to better characterise when exceptions will occur.
2. Motivating the Approach
2.1 A Role for Genetic Representation
Attempts to give a satisfactory account of innateness repeatedly come up against
the ‘interactionist consensus’ (Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999, pp. 97–100)—the
well-substantiated view that the development of all behavioural traits depends
very substantially on both genetic and non-genetic causes. This point was injected
forcefully into ethology by the comparative psychologist Daniel Lehrman in a
highly influential paper (Lehrman, 1953). At that point the dominant view, led
by Konrad Lorenz, was that many animal behaviours (instincts) were innate in
the sense of being determined by the animal’s heredity and developing entirely
independently of experience (Lorenz, 1937). Hard-wiring was also part of the
consensus, for example: the eminent ethologist Niko Tinbergen saw instinctive
behaviours as acts ‘the neuromotor apparatus of which belongs, in its complete
form, to the hereditary constitution of the animal’ (Tinbergen, 1942—his view
prior to Lehrman’s intervention).
Lehrman criticised the instinct theorists on the grounds that evolved behavioural
traits do not arise independently of experience, but develop by many ‘devious’
paths in which causes endogenous to the zygote interact in complex ways with
aspects of the environment, including an animal’s experience. Theorists have been
searching for a defensible understanding of innateness ever since. No convincing
alternative has emerged to replace the simple, but false, idea that the development
of some traits is determined by the animal’s genetic heredity and is independent of
experience.
Another, older idea is that, for some traits, the capacity to develop the trait
is internal, and present at birth, even if the trait itself is not. The interactionist
consensus also makes trouble for this idea. If having the capacity to develop a trait
at birth is compatible with the trait’s development being causally dependent on the
environment in intricate ways, it looks as if the infant is born with the capacity to
develop every trait which is a causally possible outcome of development. At least,
theorists have so far failed to identify a sense in which infants are born with the
capacity to develop only some, but not all the traits that they will eventually go on
to acquire by some means or other.
Lehrman’s critique led Lorenz to change his view and formulate a quite different
proposal, identifying innate traits as those whose development is caused by genetic
information (Lorenz, 1965). That is a modern form of the idea of being born
with the capacity for some but not all traits—that the capacity to develop certain
traits is in the genes, or genetically coded. Thus, being genetically coded is a
further candidate to provide a theoretical explication of the concept of innateness.
According to the later Lorenz, deprivation experiments show that the information
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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needed to make a trait adaptive did not come from the environment, so must
instead derive from genetic information.
Lehrman was happy to concede that some traits are coded in the genes; but he
thought that does not tell us anything about whether their development will be
insulated from environmental influences:
It seems to me, then, that although the idea that behavior patterns are
‘blueprinted’ or ‘encoded’ in the genome is a perfectly appropriate and instruc-
tive way of talking about certain problems of genetics and of evolution, it does
not in any way deal with the kind of questions about behavioural development
to which it is so often applied (Lehrman, 1970, p. 136).
Lehrman was reacting against the prevailing assumption that a behaviour’s being
coded in the genes told you all you needed to know about its development.
Lickliter and Berry (1990) homed in on this idea and christened it the ‘phylogeny
fallacy’. The fallacy is to assume that facts about the evolutionary history of a trait
should ‘lead to the belief that the process of development is thereby somehow
explained or understood, eliminating the need for any further investigation or
research’ (1990, p. 354). Lehrman’s arguments forcefully made the point that a
trait’s being genetically selected and coded in the genes does not in any way
exclude the possibility of its development depending in intricate ways on the
environment.
The Lehrman quotation suggests something stronger, however: that being genet-
ically coded cannot tell us anything about how development will unfold. Griffiths
and Gray (2005) take a similar line, accepting that an informational treatment of
(some) heredity systems is useful for thinking about evolution, but rejecting its
relevance to understanding development. One thought is that being genetically
coded is a historical property, being a matter of what a gene was selected for,
and that historical properties are causally inert. Of course it would be wrong
to think that a trait’s evolutionary history was continuing to make an impact
on development that could somehow trump current causes. Distal causes have
their effects through more proximal causes, if they are to have any effect at
all. But it is not a fallacy to think that facts about evolution and selection can
predict and explain patterns in and features of the traits we see today. I agree
that such facts do not predict that genetically evolved traits will develop inde-
pendently of the environment—Lickliter and Berry were right that it is incorrect
to presuppose that genetic coding excludes interactionist development—but I
argue below (section 3) that there are some predictions about how develop-
ment is likely to unfold that can generally be drawn from the fact that an
aspect of the adaptively-relevant information carried by a trait is genetically
represented.
Other authors don’t think it is ruled out that genetic information could play
a role in explicating innateness, but doubt that there is a satisfactory account of
genetic information that can do the job:
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In the absence of a good account of the general notion of genetic information,
identifying innateness with the genetic coding of phenotypes is trading one
confused notion for another and is therefore no progress at all (Mameli and
Bateson, 2006, p. 159).
Godfrey-Smith (2007) positively rejects the idea that the genome carries (semantic)
information about phenotypes. But, interestingly, he takes that to be a major
argument in favour of a critical or deflationary treatment of innateness. These
objections suggest that, if there were a good notion of genetic information, that
property could help us to understand innateness. The present article takes up that
challenge in the light of recent theoretical work on genetic information (Shea,
2007a, 2011, forthcoming a; Bergstrom and Rosvall, 2011). This research builds
on earlier proposals for a teleosemantic treatment of genetic information (Sterelny
et al., 1996; Maynard Smith, 2000; Jablonka, 2002),7 and follows Jablonka and
Lamb’s suggestion that a function-sensitive notion of information is a profitable
way to understand the special features of inheritance systems (Jablonka and Lamb,
2007, p. 382). However, in sharp contrast to Lorenz, I do not conclude that genetic
coding salvages the concept of innateness.
2.2 Relating This Approach to the Concept of Innateness
Our project is to see how the i-properties relate. That is a question about properties
in the world, not about anyone’s concepts. Granted, it is the rich history of
work on scientific and folk concepts of innateness that has shown there to be a
question here at all. But the present article is advancing a thesis about the relations
between the i-properties themselves. It remains neutral on questions about the
nature of the concept or concepts of innateness used by the folk and in various
sciences. So I am not claiming that in using the concept of innateness the folk
are thinking about genetic representation, or trying to keep track of the effects of
genetic representations without realising it. Nor that genetic representation gives
the meaning of innateness as it is used in one or another of the sciences. It is not
an accident that genetic coding has emerged in scientific discourse as one possible
theoretical reconstruction (e.g. in the debates canvassed above), but in my view that
is because there is a real but exception-plagued connection between the property
of being genetically coded and the other i-properties. That is a connection in the
world. Our project neither appeals to, nor sets out to explain, facts about how the
i-properties are related in the minds of either scientists or the folk.
Although it is not the concern of this article, some might want to deploy this
account in the debate about the concept or concepts of innateness. A theoretical
7 Teleosemantic accounts of genetic information remain controversial (Griffiths, 2001; Moss,
2003; Sarkar, 2003; Stegmann, 2005); the current article is not intended as a full-scale defence
of teleosemantic treatments, but instead aims to show that useful explanatory work can be
done with the account of genetic representation found in Shea, 2007a.
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reconstruction can appeal to a property that is outside the ken of any user of
the concept (e.g. the property of being H2O as a theoretical reconstruction of
the pre-modern concept of water). But if genetic representation were offered as
a theoretical reconstruction of the concept of innateness, it would have to be an
account that showed why concept users (scientists or the folk) could get away
with relying on the concept when there is so much scope for inferences amongst
the i-properties to go awry, especially in its application to human behaviour. In
this respect it would be more like explaining how chemists once got by with the
concept of phlogiston. Even if such a theoretical reconstruction were available,
it is a further question whether anybody’s innateness concept in fact refers. That
involves thorny issues in the theory of reference. I don’t need to get into those
issues here because I argue that people should stop using the concept in any event,
in both its everyday and scientific incarnations, irrespective of whether any of these
uses succeeds or fails to refer. In my view, so much confusion is now associated
with the concept (or concepts) of innateness that it would be better eliminated.
3. Inherited Representation and Adaptive Match
This section sketches an account of genetic representation that I have developed
elsewhere (Shea, 2007a, 2011, forthcoming a) and shows how it gains some
explanatory purchase on developmental questions. It allows us to explain how an
adaptive match between a feature of an organism and an aspect of its environment
can be the outcome of individual development.
By way of analogy, consider the adaptive match between the defensive armour
grown by the water flea Daphnia pulex and the presence of predators. The flea
only grows the armour if it detects in the water a particular chemical, which is a
sign of predators.8 It has a developmental mechanism that is designed to detect an
informational signal in its environment and react with an appropriate outcome. The
mechanism of adaptive plasticity in Daphnia pulex has a structure found in many
simple systems that make use of representations. It contains a consumer mechanism
which has the function of reacting to a range of different signals (chemical, no
chemical) with a range of different outputs (armour, no armour). For each output,
there is a specific condition that obtains when it performs its function in the way
that accounts for its having been selected. For the production of armour, the
condition is that there are predators present. The signal to which the consumer
mechanism reacts (the chemical) correlates with that condition. When a mechanism
has these features, teleosemantics furnishes a legitimate sense in which the signal to
8 In fact the armour can also be triggered by exposure of the mother. This maternal effect is also
a mechanism of adaptive plasticity (albeit transgenerational), carrying information for the same
reasons (a ‘detection-based effect’: Shea, Pen and Uller, 2011; Shea, forthcoming b), and so is
omitted for ease of exposition.
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which the consumer system reacts is a representation, at least of a low level variety,
having correctness conditions, or satisfaction conditions, or both (Millikan, 1984;
Shea, 2007b).
These intentional idioms do not imply that the water flea has any understanding
of the signal. It is just reacting to a chemical concentration. Considered merely
causally, the cases where it ‘reads’ information in its environment are just a subset
of all the causal factors that play a role in development. They are a subset with
a particular evolutionary function. Identifying them as such delivers additional
explanatory purchase. Analogously, the evolved functions of an organ like the heart
are a proper subset of its causal-role functions (e.g. producing characteristic sounds),
and having the extra property of being an evolved function makes a predictive
and explanatory difference. One explanatory payoff of recognising that the fleas
are representing the presence of predators comes when we ask how the fleas
manage to match their armour (on / off) adaptively to the environment (predators
/ no predators). That match is not accidental. It is the result of a mechanism
designed to detect, in the course of development, information about predators. The
explanandum concerns the source of information, calling for an explanans in terms
of reading information from the environment (in this low-level, but more than
merely causal, sense of ‘read’).
Less obviously, the same structure applies to genomes. The DNA in a zygote
is a signal that is transmitted between generations of organisms (Bergstrom and
Rosvall, 2011). The mechanisms of DNA expression are a consumer system for
zygotic DNA. They take different genotypes as input and, as a result of all the
complex interactions of development, produce different phenotypes as output
(including ‘extended’ phenotypes). Crucially for our purposes, the mechanisms of
DNA replication, expression and repair have evolved to perform the function of
transmitting phenotypes down the generations. Once a particular genotype has been
selected in virtue of some particular phenotype to which it gives rise, producing
that phenotype in response to that genotype becomes one of the functions of the
mechanisms of DNA expression. For example, a genotype G∗ might be selected
over other genotypes G in a population because, against the background of the
range of genetic and environmental conditions present at the time of selection,
expression of G∗ tended to produce organisms with thicker hair (fitter because the
environment was cold, say). Then, producing thick hair in response to G∗ would
be one of the functions of DNA expression. Furthermore, only if the environment
was cold would expression of G∗ perform its function in an evolutionarily normal
way (i.e. in the way which accounted for its selection). In our simple example, the
result of genetic selection is that the frequency of G∗ over G increases; so G∗ comes
to correlate with the colder environment. Those are all the pieces needed for there
to be representational contents in simple systems. The result of selection on genes
for their phenotypic effect—an uncontested verity of evolutionary theory—is that
genes carry representational contents, of both the indicative and the imperative
variety (Shea, 2007a). In our example G∗ in the zygote represents: the environment
is cold, produce thick hair.
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This account shows how the process of natural selection can give rise to semantic
information (i.e. representational content), and not just correlational information
(a correlation between types, e.g. of the Shannon variety). It can also apply to
other mechanisms of inheritance, but not automatically. If there are to be genuine
representation consumers in the temporally-extended processes of inheritance, then
we need to appeal to something more than the existence of selective functions.
No version of teleosemantics will be apposite—and this has not been sufficiently
appreciated—unless a mechanism of inheritance not only happens to act as a locus
for transmitting phenotypes down the generations, but also has the evolutionary
function of doing so. Only then is there a real consumer that has the function of
responding to a range of different representations (e.g. transmitted genotypes) with
a range of different outcomes (phenotypic traits). That is a demanding constraint.9
Not every case in which non-genetic phenotypic effects are heritable will satisfy it.
For example, membrane structures in the zygote act as templates to construct
the membranes of daughter cells (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005). Even if changes in
these features were heritable, it seems unlikely that the whole system has been
selected in order to be a locus for the transmission of phenotypic variants. By
contrast, if some form of chromatin marking plays a substantial role in germ line
as well as somatic cell inheritance (Jablonka and Raz, 2009), then there may well
have been selection on that mechanism for its role in transmitting phenotypes
down the generations. Transmission of behavioural phenotypes by imitation in
humans is another candidate for having the demanding (meta-) function, and so
qualifying as a system for transmitting representations between generations (Shea,
2009). I use ‘inherited representation’ for representations, carrying correlational
information as a result of natural selection, which are transmitted down the
generations by inheritance mechanisms with the selective function of transmitting
phenotypes down the generations.10 Genetic representation is one species of
inherited representation.
Armed with this account of genetic representation, we can take the explanation
of adaptive match from cases like the water flea’s defensive armour and apply it to
cases where the adaptive match is due to a history of selection. The rough idea is
that genetic representation can explain how it is that sometimes an animal knows
what to do (i.e. produces species-typical adaptive behaviour) without having to
learn (M. S. Dawkins, 1995, pp. 55–69 presses this question). For example, African
horsefly larvae of the genus Tabanidae engage in corkscrew burrowing behaviour
before pupating in wet mud. The corkscrew burrow is designed to protect the
pupa from cracks that will form if the mud dries out and cracks. We can focus
on an individual larva and ask what accounts for the adaptive match between
the burrow it builds and its future environment (cracked mud). If the standard
9 This is to agree with Godfrey-Smith (2007) that the real existence of consumers is a very
demanding constraint, but to disagree about whether it can be met.
10 Shea, Pen and Uller (2011) and Shea (forthcoming b) call these ‘selection-based effects’.
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understanding of the burrowing behaviour is correct, then the burrowing tendency
arises as a result of expression of genes that have been selected for producing
that behaviour, where natural selection on phenotypes has increased the frequency
of the burrow-producing phenotype. The question about adaptive match in an
individual case is answered as follows: developmental processes in that individual
larva relied on a genetic representation that carried representational content which
instructed a particular phenotypic outcome (the burrowing behaviour) and indicated
that the environment would be conducive to that phenotype (the mud would
crack).
As with Daphnia detecting chemicals, considered causally genes are just one of
very many factors involved in developing the burrowing behaviour in Tabanidae.
That these particular causal interactions are also a matter of reading instructional
and indicative content in the genes does not imply any spooky mind-involving
processes or a special kind of causation. What it does is to identify a proper
subset of causal factors in development that are apposite for addressing a particular
explanandum: how did the (individual) larva achieve an adaptive match between
its behaviour and the environment? That is an informational question, which
we can answer by recognising that some of the causes in development are also
representations.
The account of genetic representation outlined here is set out and argued for more
fully in Shea (2007a). The account of representation by the genome developed there
and relied upon here does not depend at all on how the idiosyncratic complexities
of development unfold. It requires correlations between genotypes and phenotypes
at the time of selection, and can then treat development as a black box. In Shea
(2007a) I went further and conceded the Lehrman point quoted above—that
genetic representation cannot tell us anything about individual development. Shea
(forthcoming a) withdraws that concession and argues that, where development
involves reading genetic representations (in our sense), some conclusions about
development do tend to follow. For instance, that makes it unlikely that there will
be a mechanism of adaptive plasticity designed to pick up on the same kind of
information in the course of individual development. The present article endorses
that view. While agreeing with Lickliter and Berry (1990) that it would be a
big mistake to think the phylogenetic facts (genetic representation) exclude the
possibility that development depends in intricate ways on the environment, I do
think genetic representation gives rise to some generalisations about development,
as argued for in the next section.
To recap, an informational question about individual development (adaptive
match to the environment), which is sometimes explained by the individual
detecting information in the course of development (e.g. in Daphnia), is also
sometimes answered by observing that information generated by a process of
natural selection over many generations is read in the course of the development (of
an individual) so as to give rise to a phenotypic feature which adaptively matches
an aspect of the individual’s environment.
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4. Explaining the Cluster
This section argues that, where some aspect of a trait develops in reliance on
a genetic representation it will tend, better than chance, to have many of
the i-properties (especially in non-human cases). As a result, even without any
analytically-guaranteed connection, using an innateness concept to make inferences
back and forth amongst the i-properties is more likely to lead to true conclusions
than if the concept were entirely defective. The discussion is initially restricted to
inferences based on genetic representation, widening later to include other forms
of inherited representation.
4.1 Universality / Species-Typicality
Where a trait develops in reliance on a genetic representation it will tend to be uni-
versal or species-typical. That is simply because only a small relative fitness advantage
is enough to drive a trait to fixation in a large population (Bromham, 2008, p. 144).
We must distinguish here between adaptive phenotypic plasticity and genetic poly-
morphisms. Evolution sometimes selects for a genetic polymorphism, which means
that there are non-universal traits that are gene-based adaptations, the development
of which is relatively insensitive to variations in developmental environment. In
plants, suites of such local adaptations can give rise to ecotypes—genetic variants
adapted to the ecology of their local environment. Similarly, genetically-selected
quantitatively variable traits are important exceptions to the generalisation about
universality.
A source of genetic polymorphisms in sexually-reproducing species is heterozy-
gote advantage, in which case the phenotype of the heterozygote may be an
adaptation (e.g. against malaria) while the phenotype of the homozygote is not (e.g.
sickle cell disease). The difference between homozygous and heterozygous carriers
of the sickle cell gene is a genetic difference, but not one that has representational
content. The sickle cell gene carries the information that the environment has
a high rate of malaria and instructs production of a protective phenotype. The
homozygote carries no more information than the heterozygote, and suffers from
the disadvantage of causing sickle cell disease. By contrast, if we look at the contrast
between human groups that do and do not carry the sickle cell gene, carrying
the gene does carry the information that you are likely to be in a malarial area.
So this is a case where a non-universal characteristic develops in reliance on a
genetic representation. Another case is where frequency-dependent selection leads
a population to contain a mix of two phenotypes, each of which is adaptive in the
context of the other (at a certain frequency). Despite such exceptions, given that
gene-based evolution has produced the robust patterns of similarity and difference
of characteristic traits observed across species and other taxa, as catalogued by
systematics over hundreds of years, a trait’s developing in reliance on a genetic
representation clearly lends some inductive support to the conclusion that it is likely
to be universal in the species.
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One type of case that produces variation in traits should not be considered an
exception, however. In cases of adaptive phenotypic plasticity, different individuals
develop different phenotypes, with each tending to be adaptive in the environment
in which it is found. The Daphnia water fleas vary in their armour. Each variant
is adaptive in its particular environmental circumstances (predators / no predators).
Neither outcome is universal or species typical (in the relevant sense). Nevertheless,
adaptive plasticity does not sever the connection between adaptation and univer-
sality, since individuals with different phenotypes share a mechanism of phenotypic
plasticity—a mechanism that detects which kind of environment the individual is
in and causes it to develop the adaptively-appropriate phenotype. The mechanism
of adaptive plasticity is universal to the species. The investment needed to develop
a mechanism of adaptive plasticity itself is only adaptive because (i) there is a
significant chance of living in a predator-rich environment; (ii) there is a significant
chance of living in a predator-free environment; and (iii) the costs of defence are
such that it is worthwhile to incur them in (i) but to forego them in (ii). Genetic
representation is not contributing specific information about the local environment
(predator-rich vs. predator-free), but it is contributing the information encapsulated
in the mechanism of adaptive plasticity, namely: there may well be predators and, if
such-and-such chemical is present, there are more likely to be predators, so produce
armour; if not, not, so don’t.
Sometimes discussions of the connection between adaptiveness and universality
make the mistake of identifying the potentially adaptive trait at the wrong level of
grain. If a phenotypic polymorphism derives from the operation of a mechanism
of adaptive plasticity, then that shared mechanism will often be a gene-based
adaptation. If so, the information encapsulated in the mechanism of adaptive
plasticity derives from a genetic representation, so this is a case where reliance on
genetic representation gives rise to a universal characteristic: not the final outcome,
but the possession of the mechanism of developmental plasticity.
The inference in the opposite direction, from universality to developing on the
basis of a genetic representation, only has any force when an adaptive aspect of a trait
is under consideration. Even then there will be exceptions. Consider what would
happen if the density of predators increased so that there were always predators in
the water flea’s developmental environment, with defensive armour becoming uni-
versal. Armour would then be a universal trait which adaptively matched the envi-
ronment (predators) but which was due to a developmental process designed to pick
up on environmental information (the chemical signal). In practice, genetic assimi-
lation will militate against the perpetuation of such cases (Gilbert and Epel, 2009, pp.
381–4). When the range of environments narrows so that a mechanism affording
adaptive plasticity to other environments is no longer needed, there will be selec-
tion pressure against maintaining the mechanism and selection pressure in favour of
canalizing the phenotype against environmental variation. Nevertheless, it is by no
means guaranteed that a universal adaptation develops in reliance on a genetic rep-
resentation. The problem is particularly acute with human psychological traits, since
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human development is supremely adaptively plastic, even with respect to features
of the environment that are very widely shared (e.g. the belief that water is wet).
4.2 Developmental Invariance
Traits that develop in reliance on a genetic representation will tend to have a certain
kind of developmental invariance, that is, they will tend to develop across the
range of environments that were present when the trait was selected. For natural
selection to have operated in the first place the phenotypic variant under selection
has to have had a reasonably high degree of heritability, which is to say that the
genotype-phenotype correlation must have been robust across a reasonably wide
range of the developmental environments encountered by the organism during
selection. To the extent that current or experimentally induced variations in the
developmental environment fall within the range encountered during selection of
the trait, the selected outcome will tend, better than chance, to be produced despite
such variations.
Once we go outside the parameters encountered in selective environments, there
is no reason to expect developmental invariance. To take up an earlier example,
development of normal skin structure in primates is invariant in the face of wide
variation in diet (e.g. from berries to tropical fruit), but does not develop in
environments that differ from the historical range and contain no vitamin C in
the diet (e.g. a diet of pure junk food). So a trait that is developmentally invariant
across the range of environments in which it was selected may be very sensitive to
variations that occur amongst current environments.
The extent to which an adaptive trait is now developmentally invariant depends
upon the extent to which past selective environments varied in ways that are
causally-relevant to its development, and the extent to which causally-relevant
variations in currently-experienced environments exceed those limits. For many
traits of non-human species the range of relevant variation in historical and current
environments is sufficiently similar that traits which develop in reliance on a
genetic representation will continue to develop across a wide range of current
developmental environments. However, where the environment has changed
beyond the historical parameters there will be exceptions, and those exceptions
will be especially important in humans, since the range of environments in which
humans develop has now been altered radically in some respects.
A trait is canalized against variations in the environment if the way it develops
is buffered against environmental variations or if there are alternative pathways
or backup mechanisms for its development which ensure that the same outcome
is achieved despite differences in the environment. One large-scale example is
thermoregulation, which canalizes a whole host of developmental pathways against
variations in the temperature of the developmental environment. Canalization is an
active variety of developmental invariance.
Adaptation also explains developmental canalization (Ariew, 1999). A gene may
be selected initially despite not producing beneficial outcomes in all circum-
stances. Some environments may lead to a developmental outcome P+ that is
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fitness-enhancing and some (‘hindering’ environments) to an outcome P– that is
fitness-reducing. The gene will be selected if the fitness benefits of P+ outweigh the
fitness costs of P–. However, once the gene has been selected, there remains a selec-
tion pressure to produce P+ in the hindering environments as well. So mechanisms
may be selected which allow P+ to develop across a broader range of environments.
Development of a trait can thereby come to be canalized against environmental
variation (against the variation encountered in its evolutionary history). A trait will
be canalized across variations in the current environment to the extent that those
variations overlap with the variation encountered in its selective history.
Invariance in the face of environmental variation is a degenerate form of a
norm of reaction: a mapping from environments to phenotypes, given a particular
genotype. A genotype may have a much more complex norm of reaction. A
common example is the level of activity of an enzyme produced by a particular
gene (Lewontin, 1974, p. 407; Nijhout, 2001). The enzyme will have different
levels of activity at different temperatures. In organisms without thermoregulation,
the effects of the enzyme will vary continuously across variations in the temperature
of the developmental environment. (A genetic variant may produce a related
enzyme with a different temperature optimum.) The gene for the enzyme will tend
to be selected if, across the range of evolutionary environments, the fitness benefits
of the different phenotypes produced are on average positive (averaging according
to the frequency with which those environments are encountered, modified to take
account of population structure in some cases). So natural selection can explain why
development in a species has the reaction norm it does (e.g. Lind and Johansson,
2007; Pen et al., 2010). Fitness benefits at one or more points on the norm of
reaction may outweigh the fitness costs of the phenotypes which result at other
points. Where the norm of reaction is such that there are two or more phenotypic
outcomes with each conferring a fitness advantage in its particular environment
by a different route, then we are back to a case of adaptive plasticity, as discussed
above.
In other cases a norm of reaction has been selected because it produces an
adaptive mix between different phenotypes. Sex ratios are an example. In many
crocodilians, sex determination depends on the incubation temperature of the egg.
Either different ratios have been adaptive in different environments, or the variabil-
ity of temperature in selective environments has been sufficiently wide to ensure
that this mechanism produces an adaptive sex ratio. In such cases, there is genetic
selection for a mechanism to produce a particular overall sex ratio. The genome
carries an instruction about the probability with which each sex should be produced
(e.g. 50% chance of producing a male). In the course of individual development,
temperature is not being consumed as a representation of some adaptively-relevant
environmental parameter; rather, it is part of the causal basis on which a given
sex ratio is achieved. Such cases serve to weaken the connection between
genetic representation and developmental invariance, but do not undermine it
completely.
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The inference in the opposite direction, from the developmental invariance of
an adaptive aspect of a trait in current environments, to its developing in reliance
on a genetic representation, will go through in many cases. As with universality,
there will be exceptions when the current environment has become narrower or
otherwise altered to be restricted to only one of the range of environmentally-cued
phenotypic outcomes on which selection originally acted. Those exceptions will
be especially important where cultural processes can lead learnt outcomes to arise
across a wide range of current developmental environments (e.g. the belief that
water is liquid).11
4.3 Evolutionary Adaptation
By construction, any trait that develops in reliance on a genetic representation is an
evolutionary adaptation. As noted above, not all evolutionary adaptations need be
transmitted by DNA, or indeed by any other inheritance system, so the inference in
the other direction is not watertight. Nevertheless, given the undisputed importance
of genetic evolution, especially outside humans, the inference from evolutionary
adaptation to developing in reliance on a genetic representation is strong. As before,
care is needed about the level of grain: it is the aspect of a trait whose adaptive
match to the environment is explained by a history of selection about which we
can say that it develops in reliance on a genetic representation.
A potential objection is that inferences can be made between adaptation and the
other i-properties directly—so why go via genetic representation? The informa-
tional treatment has the advantage of allowing us to predict and explain features
of the developmental process. Those explanatory payoffs are set out in detail in
Shea (forthcoming a) and there is not space to repeat them all here, but Section
3 above highlighted one explanatory question that is distinctively informational:
asking where in the course of individual development the information derives that
accounts for development eventuating in a trait, a feature of which adaptively
matches the environment. An explanation in terms of genetic representation is
more direct than one that can appeal only to genetic adaptation. Secondly, by
underwriting parallels between genetic and environmental sources of information
in development, it can explain the existence of trade-offs between the two sources
(Leimar et al., 2006). Even the later Lorenz (1965) was committed to a dichotomy:
the information required for an adaptive match must derive either from the envi-
ronment or from inheritance but not both. A merit of our treatment of genetic
representation is that it shows how both genetic and environmental information
may contribute to a particular adaptive match.12 A third advantage is that it allows us
11 This is to agree with Griffiths and Machery (2008) that human behavioural adaptations may
well not be canalized against environmental variation.
12 The possibility of such a mix was one of Haldane’s criticisms of the later Lorenz’s account of
innateness (Griffiths, 2004).
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to see the connection between poverty of the stimulus arguments—which concern
the sources of information available to development—and the other i-properties,
as we shall see next.
4.4 Learning / Poverty of the Stimulus
One way to test whether an adaptive match between trait and environment develops
in reliance on environmental information is to examine whether the trait develops
in the same way in the absence of any relevant cues from the environment—i.e.
that a poverty of the stimulus argument can be made about an aspect of the trait.
The poverty-of-the-stimulus test is compatible with the interactionist consensus and
is not aimed at assessing the extent of causal interaction with the environment. The
development of a trait may be the result of rich causal interdependence between
a series of internal and external factors, but if the relevant information (e.g. that
the mud the animal is burrowing in is likely to dry up and crack) is not detectable
in the environment given the organism’s sensory and learning mechanisms, then
we can infer that that aspect of the trait (e.g. the pattern of burrowing behaviour)
developed in reliance on a genetic representation. Cross-fostering experiments, for
example, are designed to uncover whether development of a trait depends, not
just causally on the environment, but specifically on reading adaptively-relevant
correlational information that is specific to the environment into which the offspring
are fostered.
If poverty of the stimulus arguments are couched in terms of the bare correlational
information available in the environment, they tend to miss their mark. Whenever
the development of a trait is causally dependent on an aspect of the environment, the
environment will carry information—in the bare correlational sense—about the
trait (Griffiths and Gray, 1994). But these are not examples of the mechanisms
of development reading or consuming a representation. For example, primates do
not ‘read’ information in dietary vitamin C in order to produce the outcome of
normal skin structure (although dietary vitamin C vs. its absence does correlate
with normal versus abnormal skin structure). Only when the way development
reacts to a piece of correlational information in the environment is a matter of
evolutionary design, with the function of producing a variable outcome depending
upon the detected state of the environment, is it right to think of development
as reading or consuming a representation in the environment. So the connection
between the collection of i-properties and genetic representation is tighter than
the connection between the i-properties and poverty of the stimulus arguments
which understand information in just the correlational, causal sense (Khalidi, 2002,
following Chomsky). An account which treats a trait as innate only if it would still
emerge in an impoverished environment will end up wrongly excluding very many
cases where genetic representations are relied upon, but where rich interaction
with the environment is still needed for normal development. These range from
non-biological supporting causes (temperature, light, nutrition), through the effects
of stimulation on the nervous system (both passively, and through spontaneously
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and exogenously-driven practice), to various practice effects that depend upon the
physics of the limbs and the environment.
Pointing to semantic information allows a subtler treatment. Many cognitive
traits that result from learning also depend upon pre-existing cognitive architecture,
constraints or biases, in which case the trait develops partly in reliance on environ-
mental information and partly in reliance on the inherited representations which
are responsible for those constraints. Only with respect to the latter is an inference
to other i-properties (universality, invariance, adaptation) inductively supported.
Indeed, there may be cases where the cognitive trait would not develop at all
in the context of impoverished stimuli, thus counting as non-innate on Khalidi’s
account; but where, when it does develop normally, some of the information in
the mature structure has a non-environmental source. Face perception is a plausible
example: in order to recognise faces we need a lot of experience of looking at
faces, from which we extract information about regularities and invariants; but the
basic neonatal bias to attend preferentially to faces may well depend on genetic
representation, and be a developmentally-invariant, species-typical adaptation for
developing face recognition abilities (Johnson et al., 1991).
Poverty of the stimulus arguments test whether adaptively-relevant information
has been extracted from the environment during development. Learning is the
central example. Where the adaptive match between an aspect of a trait and the
environment is due to learning, there is unlikely to be genetic representation of that
same feature, or development would have been canalized to the adaptive outcome in
any event. Conversely, genetic representation obviates the need for learning. These
considerations underpin the success of the generalisation: genetically represented
→ not learnt13 (nor the result of a mechanism of adaptive plasticity); and also the
converse: where a feature of a trait adaptively matches its environment but is not
genetically represented, it is likely to be learnt or acquired via a mechanism of
adaptive plasticity (again with many more exceptions in humans where non-genetic
adaptations are much more important). That shows why there really is a connection
between learning (i-property (viii)) and the other i-properties discussed above:
universality, invariance and adaptation.
4.5 Other i-properties
As we saw above, genetic determination (i-property (ii)) cannot plausibly be
construed as genetic determinism (too strong, contra the interactionist consensus),
nor as there being some genetic cause (too weak—applies to every trait). There
may be a good distinction to be drawn between active causes and background
causes, or an account which could be given of the relative causal contributions of
external and internal factors to the development of a trait. Intuitively, body plan
depends more on internal causes than does dialect, say. Philosophers have attempted
13 Cp. innate → not learnt; equivalently learnt → not innate.
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to give a more rigorous treatment these distinctions (e.g. Northcott, 2006), but
although that project is not conclusively refuted (Godfrey-Smith, 2007), neither
is it satisfactorily resolved. If it were, there could turn out to be a connection
between being genetically represented and genetic factors making a greater causal
contribution to development, although it is not clear why that should be.
By contrast, the connection of genetic programming (i-property (vi)) to the other
i-properties is vindicated. My claim is precisely that being genetically programmed,
in the sense of being represented by the genome, is the underlying property which
explains why the other i-properties cluster together in actual cases.
The connection with being present at birth (i-property (i)) also makes sense.
Many traits are not present at birth, nor is the baby born with a capacity to develop
the trait without environmental support, but where an aspect of a trait develops in
reliance on a genetic representation, the information was indeed present at birth.
The inference in the opposite direction is less secure since, as we have seen, the
new-born baby has already undergone learning in utero, and may also have received
signals about its likely environment directly from its mother in the form of maternal
effects.
The connection with heritability (i-property (vii)) is less direct. Where there
are different phenotypic variants which are each adaptive, then if those variants
are genetically heritable it very likely that development of the trait depends
upon reading a genetic representation (e.g. genetically-based adaptive ecotypes). In
addition, natural selection on genes only operates if the phenotypes which they
produce are heritable. But that only requires heritability at the time of selection,
assessed relative to the range of genotypes in the population at the time of selection
and the range of developmental environments that were encountered. Adaptations
that have gone to fixation will no longer be heritable (except during episodes
of stabilising selection). So a constrained kind of inference from heritability to
genetic representation and developmental invariance is supported, but not the
converse.
The extent of the connection between genetic representation and modularity
(i-property (ix)) is more tenuous. As we will see in the next section, information
which is implicit in the operation of an informationally-encapsulated psychological
module need not derive from genetic representation, but may come from culturally
inherited representations, or from learning.
Finally, genetic representation throws light on the intuitive idea canvassed at the
outset: that innate traits are hard-wired and develop in a way that bypasses the
processes of personal-level psychology (the will, etc.). When a genetic representation
is consumed so as to lead to a particular developmental outcome, that is not a
psychological-level process of reading or learning from a piece of information.
From the perspective of the individual person, genetic representations form part of
their constitution, as one of the set of factors that structure who they are and how
they behave. Development in reliance on a genetic representation is not causally
determinative of a particular outcome—the result may be malleable in the light
of a person’s intentions and decisions. Nevertheless, the way the genetic effect
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produced an outcome at the time it was selected is unlikely to have proceeded via
personal-level psychology.
For example, the facial expression of basic emotions (‘affect programs’) is
widely shared across considerable variations in the kinds of environments in which
people grow up. Plausibly, many of these dispositions have social-communicative
evolutionary functions. But the development of these dispositions does not seem
to depend upon individuals reasoning about how they should communicate their
emotions and, once developed, the reason why we smile (rather than frown, say)
when we’re happy is not available at the personal level. Nevertheless, I can decide
not to and, through a programme of the right kind of training, effectively give
myself the appearance of a sulky old grump. So genetic representation gives us
a sense in which innate traits, while not being causally determined, nevertheless
normally develop by a route that does not depend on personal level mechanisms
(or the will if such exists).
4.6 Application to Non-Adaptations
Consider pathological cases: genetic diseases and acquired pathology (e.g. aphasia
caused by head trauma). My claim has been that, when applied to an adaptation,
various i-properties are a rough guide to whether an aspect of a trait does or does not
develop in reliance on a genetic representation. I have not discussed whether the
i-properties might be connected or come apart when applied to features which are
not adaptations (neutral or pathological traits). The existing literature on innateness
suggests that they come apart in very many ways.
Nevertheless, people are inclined to treat genetic diseases as being innate and
acquired pathology as being non-innate. Such inferences may not be vindicated by
generalisations that really connect the i-properties, but they might still be explained
by features of the concepts of innateness used by scientists or the folk. In particular,
in both vernacular uses (Griffiths, Machery and Linquist, 2009; Linquist et al.,
2011) and scientific uses (Knobe and Samuels, in progress) fixity is a strong driver
of innateness judgements. Indeed, in everyday uses fixity has become somewhat
detached from the property of being present at birth, in talk of one’s ‘political
DNA’ and such like, for example: ‘This music was so much a part of my upbringing
that I feel very connected to it. It’s totally part of my DNA’.14 I would suggest
the following captures a common way that the concept is applied, at least in its
everyday use:
If
(i) an organism O has trait T at some time t’ > t; and
(ii) O would have had T at t’ even if the environment with which O interacted
between t and t’ had been different in certain ways (specified by the context)
14 Annie Lennox, quoted in Saga Magazine, December 2010, p. 48.
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then that is good evidence that T was innate to O at t; and the converse.
Application of this inferential frame to a pathological condition caused by an
environmental insult will count it as non-innate. Application to a disease where
it is a genetic difference from the normal population which accounts for why an
individual has a dysfunctional outcome will, against most contexts of comparison,
count the disease as innate. In short, innateness judgements about non-adaptations
probably result from application of means of identification that gain their efficacy
from the fact that the i-properties tend to cluster together when applied to
adaptations.
It is worth remarking that this brings out the contrast between the purely causal
notion of genetic determination and our precise sense in which an aspect of a trait
may develop in reliance on genetic representation. A phenotypic difference may
be caused by a genetic difference (against some background context held fixed),
as in the case of a genetic disease—in neutral cases such traits may go to fixation
through drift (especially in small populations)—but without selection, there is no
genetic representation, and nor is there an explanans at the outcome of development
(adaptive match) to which genetic representation would be the explanandum.
5. Where the Inferences Go Wrong
There are several further reasons why inferences between the i-properties go awry,
especially when applied to humans, despite the role of genetic representation in
generating a genuine cluster. The first is that DNA is not the only source of inherited
representations. We noted above that there may be other systems of inheritance that
have the function of transmitting phenotypes down the generations. Chromatin
marking is one candidate. Learning by imitation in humans is another.
Epigenetic inheritance systems like chromatin marking that are associated with
the genome and pass on its state of gene activity or expression stably down
many generations will be a source of inherited representation that acts much
like genetic representation. When an adaptive trait has evolved on the basis of
epigenetic inheritance the information on the basis of which development arrives
at an outcome that adaptively matches the environment was present at birth. That
information is read in the course of development, so the trait can still develop in
the absence of any environmental correlate of the adaptively-relevant matter of fact
(poverty of the stimulus). The outcome is likely to be universal or species-typical,
and developmentally invariant or canalized against variations in the developmental
environment, within the range of environments in which it evolved. Selection of
the trait will have depended on there being a heritable epigenetic difference during
the course of selection, and if there is still relevant variation in the population the
trait will look just like a genetically-heritable trait in a population analysis (Badyaev
and Uller, 2009). Only the inference to ‘programmed in the genes’ (i-property
(vi)) is undermined. If epigenetic inheritance systems turn out to be an important
source of adaptations (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005), then in many cases inferences
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amongst the i-properties will be licensed not by genetic representation, but by
other sources of inherited representation that are present at birth.
With humans the problem becomes even more acute. Learning by ‘over-
imitation’ in humans may be an adaptation for transmitting behavioural phenotypes
down the generations (Shea, 2009). Where a behavioural adaptation evolves by
natural selection on variants that are passed on by over-imitation the correlational
information that the particular behaviour is fitness enhancing (e.g. that a certain
food preparation practice has long-term benefits) is generated by a process of
selection. There may be nothing in the environment that would allow an individual
to learn for themselves about the value of the behaviour (e.g. because feedback is
too stochastic or too delayed). Nevertheless, by faithfully imitating the behaviour
of their parents, children could come to develop an adaptive phenotype. So not all
inherited representation is present at birth, as Lorenz (1965) claimed.
Outcome-insensitive over-imitation is one example of the way human develop-
ment may rely on inherited representation—where correlations are not detected in
individual learning but through a process of selection over many generations—that
is read from the developmental environment. Aspects of a trait that develop in that
way will tend to have the i-properties: they will arise in development invariantly
across the range of environmental variation present when they were selected,
they may well become universal or typical of the species, and they develop
in the absence of any information or feedback that tells the organism that the
resulting behaviour is adaptively-relevant. Therefore, development in reliance on
environmentally-mediated inherited representation has quite different characteris-
tics from development that involves learning from the environment or other kinds
of adaptive plasticity based on reading or consuming informational cues in the envi-
ronment. That is a further respect in which our account of inherited representation
represents a major break from the later Lorenz (1965). The deprivation experiment
is a particularly poor test for inherited representation when a substantial amount of
inherited representational content is not present at birth, but is transmitted through
the environment.
Lorenz argued that development consists in the interaction between heredity and
the environment, Lehrman that it consists in the interaction between an organism
and its environment (Lehrman, 1953, p. 345). The full picture is that development
consists in the interaction between all three: the organism, its heredity and the
environment.
Although there are some behavioural traditions in other species, the role of
inherited representational content that is not present at birth is particularly important
for humans. Humans have lived in social groups or tribes between which there are
large behavioural differences, for example between hunter-gatherers and pastoralists
and agriculturalists. Anthropology has given us a rich catalogue of these large
differences in ways of life, skills, tools, food preparation practices, rituals and
mystical beliefs. There is a strong tendency to think of these differences as being
due to differences that are present at birth, just as differences between different
species or breeds of animals and plants are. The finding that, for most of these
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characteristics, humans turn into the kind of people they grow up with, and not
the kind of people their parents were (when the two diverge), was a revolutionary
discovery which everyday thinking has not yet fully assimilated. It led to a crisis
in the world of anthropology, precipitating a split between biological and cultural
anthropology (Kronfeldner, 2009).
Several theorists have argued that humans have crossed a Darwinian threshold
in the extent to which cultural processes are responsible for producing adaptive
phenotypes (Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry, 1995; Sterelny, 2006). If so, the
developmental environment, in particular the social environment, is an especially
important source of inherited representation in human development. We can
distinguish between internal causes and environmental causes in development,
although the development of most behavioural phenotypes will depend upon
both. We can also distinguish between correlational information that an individual
could detect and learn from, and information that is generated by a process of
selection. Those two distinctions do not align at all well in humans: much inherited
representation is located, causally, in the developmental environment. It is perfectly
cogent to ask whether some trait is biologically or culturally inherited, but it is
a mistake to think this lines up with the distinction between development being
caused by internal or external factors. Whether an aspect of a trait develops in
reliance on biological inherited representation (genetic, epigenetic) or cultural
inherited representation (imitation, etc.), the cause of its development is likely to
be a rich interplay between internal and external factors.
It follows that the use of the innateness concept—with an associated set of
conceptions that includes all or most of the i-properties—is particularly problematic
when applied to human behavioural traits. In such cases we have little inductive or
abductive reason, much less a guarantee, that the inferences involving the concept
of innateness will take us to true conclusions.
So when evolutionary psychologists identify a behavioural or psychological
capacity that looks to be adapted to features of human lifeways, and claim that
it is innate, we should be slow to conclude that it has evolved through genetic
selection and develops in reliance on a genetic representation. Culturally inherited
representation is likely to be important, as may be processes of individual learning.
The development of such adaptive capacities is likely to be much less informationally
encapsulated than nativist theorists suppose, even if the online operation of the
mature capacity has become relatively informationally encapsulated. For example,
development of the human capacity to keep track of the mental states of others
may depend heavily on niche construction and persisting changes to the learning
environment (downstream epistemic engineering), so that it arises reliably across
the wide range of environments in which people grow up, but not in a way that is
independent of information from the environment (Sterelny, 2003). Human moral
psychology, and its links with the emotions, is another likely example.
Putative universal features of human grammar offer a contrast case. If there
are such universals, and if they are adaptations (for example, as a solution to the
problem of serial communication), then they may well be due to gene-based
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selection. The opposing view is that language universals are due to learnability
constraints, with cultural selection on different languages leading to the selection
of those that humans can learn most easily. As with many other psychological
capacities (e.g. intuitive physics, multi-step reasoning), the question of the relative
contribution of biological inherited representation, cultural inherited representation
and environmental information is yet to be settled empirically.
6. Conclusion
Philosophers and others have offered various analyses and theoretical explications
of the concept of innateness. The leading candidates are developmental invariance
or canalization; developing in response to an impoverished stimulus; not being
dependent on learning; and being an evolutionary adaptation. None of these
treatments lines up with an intuitive classification of traits into the innate and
non-innate. Each fails even on some central cases. However, we can understand the
attraction of each proposal when we see that they are roughly and non-accidentally
aligned. The reason is that each tends to follow when an aspect of an adaptive trait
develops in reliance on a genetic representation.
Genetic information had been passed over in the innateness literature for lack of
a satisfactory account of that property. This article shows that one merit of a recent
but by no means uncontroversial account of (semantic) genetic information (Shea,
2007a) is that it can explain why the i-properties tend to cluster together. Armed
with a good theory of genetic representation, it becomes clear that there are non-
accidental connections between the i-properties and the property of developing in
reliance on a genetic representation. It also reveals why the concept of innateness
is defective, by showing that inferences amongst the i-properties are likely to go
awry, especially with respect to human psychology and behaviour.
One reaction is that the innateness concept should be salvaged and defined in
terms of genetic representation. That would be a mistake, for two reasons. First
it would obscure the way the various i-properties dissociate even for non-human
traits. Working directly with the i-properties themselves makes it more apparent
where the inferences will fail. Using the concept of innateness makes bad inferences
more likely. Secondly, inferences amongst the i-properties are particularly likely
to fail when applied to human traits, especially to human psychological traits and
behaviour. Deploying a concept of innateness in this field, when the concept
derives its inductive support elsewhere, has been the source of a series of mistakes
in reasoning about human cognition and behaviour. We will understand human
psychology much better when we jettison the concept of innateness in favour of
sharper distinctions made in terms of the i-properties directly.
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